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For the most part, the decisions of the Louisiana appellate courts
during the past term on the subjects of legislative procedure and inter-
pretation of legislation applied well-established rules. For example, it
was held that the legislature is presumed to enact a statute with full
knowledge of all others on the subject, justifying the interpretive rule
of construing statutes in pari materiae with other statutes on the same
subject matter.' It was also held, consistent with earlier cases,2 that the
understanding of one legislator is not determinative of legislative intent,3
and indeed is not even admissible for the purpose of demonstrating that
intent.4 There were predictable holdings that a statute should be inter-
preted in a manner in which it would be valid,' though this principle
did not prevent one court from holding that a criminal statute concerning
driving while intoxicated did not make it a crime to ride a horse while
intoxicated.6 There were also decisions on the sufficiency of the title of
legislation, 7 and the distinction between promulgation and publication.'
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
*Member, Louisiana Bar Association.
1. Bunch v. Town of St. Francisville, 446 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984);
Turner v. City of Shreveport, 437 So. 2d 961 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
2. See Ethyl Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 351 So. 2d 1290 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 1035 (La. 1978).
3. Macon v. Costa, 437 So. 2d 806 (La. 1983).
4. Delahoussaye v. State Racing Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
5. See, e.g., Weeden Eng'g Corp. v. Hale, 435 So. 2d 1158 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 764 (La. 1983).
6. State v. Williams, 449 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). The accused was
intoxicated and rode a horse onto a highway, where he was involved in an accident with
a motor vehicle. He was charged under La. R.S. 14:98 (Supp. 1984), which makes it a
crime for a person to operate "any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, vessel, or other
means of conveyance when under the influence of alcoholic beverages .... ." Using the
familiar ejusdem generis rule that general words following particular classes of things
should be construed to refer to things of the same general nature as those specifically
enumerated, the court concluded that "other means of conveyance" did not include a
horse. Id. at 744.
7. Anzelmo v. Louisiana Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 435 So. 2d 1082
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
8. State v. Miller, 448 So. 2d 137 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (A criminal proceeding: statute
under which charge was brought was made effective upon governor's signature on June
29, 1979, though not actually published until July 14, 1979, five days after the commission
of the crime; held that the legislature had constitutional authority to fix an effective date
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In addition to these relatively mundane holdings, there were some
decisions meriting extended comment. One involves what may be simply
an error in terminology, but the others call for more lengthy discussion.
NICETIES OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE
The "terminology" problem arose in In re Hamilton.9 The case was
interesting on its merits, for the court had to decide whether a beneficiary
under a life insurance policy who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter
of the insured was barred from recovery under a statute barring be-
neficiaries "criminally responsible" for the death. The issue was far
from clear because of the legislature's insertion of the phrase "intentional
acts exclusion" in the heading'" of the statute, indicating perhaps that
the bar applied only where the conduct of the beneficiary had been
intentional, as opposed to being merely reckless or driven by passion.
In interpreting the enactment, the court correctly observed that the
"title" to the bill could be considered to determine legislative intent,
but it apparently had the "heading" in mind when it said "title." It
spoke of a conflict between the "title" and the "text" and then quoted
from the "preamble" in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity. The actual
interpretation seems sound, but the confusion about the parts of the
enactment calls for a definition of terms.
The "heading" of a statute is a short description of its contents,
usually printed in some form of bold-face type immediately after the
section number. The heading is not part of the statute," though the
legislature has followed a custom in recent years of enacting a heading
along with the body of the statute. The heading is neither the "title"
to the enactment nor a "preamble."
The "title" to an enactment is the only portion with constitutional
importance. The constitution requires that every bill have a brief title
indicating its object,1 2 but does not require that a bill have either a
heading or a preamble. The title is that portion of the enactment which,
in current legislative drafting custom, follows the words "An Act" at
even prior to publication, and that such a "promulgation" would make the statute effective
as of the time of the governor's signature.), cert. denied, 449 So. 2d 1355 (La. 1984).
9. 446 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the insurance law
aspects of the decision, see McKenzie & Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-
Insurance, 45 La. L. Rev. 325, 326 (1984).
10. "Heading" is a term of art used to describe the short description of the contents
of a statute, usually printed in bold-face type immediately after the section number. See
infra text accompanying notes 11-13.
11. La. R.S. 1:13 (1973) provides that the "Headings to sections, source notes
and cross references are given for the purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute
part of the law." The problem in Hamilton arose because the enactment added "intentional
acts exclusion" to the heading but the broader "criminally responsible" language to the
text of the statute.
12. La. Const. art. III, § 15(A).
[Vol. 45
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84
the beginning of the bill, and terminates just before the constitutionally-
required enacting clause. The Hamilton court properly quoted from the
title in an attempt to resolve the interpretive problem, but erroneously
termed the title the "preamble." In fact, the act in question did not
contain a preamble.
The "preamble" to an enactment is a recitation of either the facts
or the policy which the legislature announces as its reason for the
enactment. 3 It generally serves very little purpose other than to allow
some high-sounding language at the opening of a statute, or to attempt
to establish some constitutional ground for an enactment which may
have a shaky constitutional basis. Though it is not inconceivable that
a preamble might be of some use in interpretation (though one is rarely
included in the ordinary Louisiana enactment), the title to a bill is much
more instructive. The court in Hamilton was actually using the "title";
it simply called the title the "preamble." Since that could lead to
confusion in future cases, this brief explanation has been offered.
The second decision of note is State v. Stirgus,1 4 a criminal pro-
ceeding in which a local law was declared unconstitutional because the
constitutionally-required advertisement period prior to its enactment never
occurred. The local statute in question had been advertised on April 3
and 4, 1980, and was introduced on April 23, 1980. Only nineteen
days-rather than the thirty days required by the constitution- had
elapsed. Nevertheless, the bill contained the customary recitation that
notice of intention to introduce the act had been published in accordance
with the constitution.
This recitation, clearly at variance with demonstrable facts, presented
the court with the question of whether it could look behind the recitation,
and receive evidence that the legislature had not in fact done what it
said it had. Citing an earlier comment in this review, 5 the supreme
court properly held that the scope of judicial inquiry into conformity
with constitutional standards may well differ from that into a legislative
body's adherence to its own internal rules of procedure. The courts
must retain the power to ascertain whether a constitutionally prescribed
procedure has been followed. Otherwise, the legislature would be free
to assert that it had complied with the constitution, and there would
be no way to determine whether it had or not.
I RETROACTIVITY
A voluminous dissertation could and should be written on retroac-
13. See generally Note, Legal Effect of Preambles-Statutes, 41 Cornell L.Q. 134
(1955).
14. 437 So. 2d 249 (La. 1983).
15. Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Enactment Process: Louisiana's
"Journal Entry" Rule, 41 La. L. Rev. 1187 (1981).
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tivity of legislation in Louisiana. Unfortunately, this is neither the time
nor the place for such an exercise. But the decision in Coates v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp. 6 does present the opportunity to offer a few
remarks on the subject.
Few people realize that a Louisiana statute provides that no section
of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly stated to be.' 1
This codifies the usual rule for legislative enactments, and is the opposite
of the customary rule for judicial pronouncements. Use of this principle
might go a long way toward settling disputes over the application of
an enactment. The results of application of this principle might not
necessarily conform with some of the past jurisprudence, which developed
certain "exceptions" to the rule of prospectivity.'8 These exceptions are
usually applied despite the fact that the legislature may not have ex-
pressed itself on the question of retroactivity as required by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 1:2. Thus the judiciary has sometimes "assumed" that
a retroactive application was' intended in the face of legislative silence
when the enactment falls into certain categories. A literal reading of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:2 would eliminate these exceptions. The
legislature is free to announce a retroactive application, of course, thus
freeing the court from the need to make such a decision, unless there
are constitutional problems.
The Coates opinion does not blaze any new trails, falling within
the established pattern of discussing the usual exceptions. The claimants
sought retroactive application of the recent amendment to Civil Code
article 2315 allowing damages for loss of consortium. It was urged that
the amendments were merely "interpretive" and should therefore fall
within one of the exceptions permitting retroactive application. There is
serious doubt about the validity of this exception in any event, both
for the reasons expressed above, and because an "interpretive" enactment
begins to give the legislature judicial power.' 9 But the court did not
reach the issue of the validity of the exception, since it found that the
enactment was not merely an interpretation of article 2315. Rather, the
amendment added a concept to Louisiana law. A frontal assault on the
problem of retroactive application and the judicially crafted exceptions
will have to await another case and another day.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
Easily the most interesting case is State v. Broom. 20 Broom, a
criminal proceeding, brought to the forefront an issue long simmering
16. 444 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
17. La. R.S. 1:2 (1973).
18. Among these are when a statute is "procedural," "interpretive," or "remedial."
19. See La. Const. art. 11, §§ 1-2.
20. 439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983).
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in Louisiana: delegation of legislative authority. Broom had been charged
with violating regulations of the Louisiana Explosive Code. The legis-
lature had given the Director of Public Safety authority to establish
regulations "reasonably necessary" to protect public health and safety
and had made violation of those regulations punishable as a felony.
The accused had urged, and the trial court agreed, that this was
an unauthorized delegation of legislative authority. The trial court there-
fore quashed the bill of information, and the state appealed. On original
hearing, the supreme court reversed. But on rehearing, a divided court
affirmed the trial court's holding that the enactment was unconstitutional
as a violation of separation of powers.
Delegation of legislative authority is a complex problem, and is
becoming more so. An historical perspective might be useful here. Neither
the federal Constitution nor the various state constitutions specifically
provide for delegation of legislative power, much less division of leg-
islative power. In fact, it is usually said that the basic principle must
be that legislative power cannot be delegated.2' But this is true in theory
only; in practice a great number of pronouncements appearing to be
the exercise of legislative power are in the hands of non-legislators. The
usual explanation is that legislative power has not been delegated, only
subordinate authority to fill in details of legislative enactments, or to
act independently but within the confines of an enabling legislative
pronouncement.
Since our constitutions do not provide for delegation of legislative
power, we must look elsewhere to find the criteria by which such power
is exercised, though in a subordinate fashion. The primary source must
be in court decisions on whether legislative power had been properly
delegated in a particular instance, or whether the power of delegation
had been abused. These decisions are those of judges who are grappling
with questions of abuse of an implied constitutional doctrine. They are
not those of the legislators who did the delegating, and in the ordinary
21. In part, this is based upon the common law maxim delegata potestas non potest
delegari (a delegated power cannot itself be delegated). Since both the Congress and the
various state legislatures possess powers delegated by the people, in theory no further
delegation may be made. This principle is also based upon the traditional tripartite division
of government into executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and the supplementary
injunction in many state constitutions that no branch may exercise the powers granted
to another. See, e.g., La. Const. art. II, § 2. Statement of the principle, to which there
are numerous exceptions and modifications, is a sine qua non in most opinions on the
subject. Despite this oft-stated principle, it is clear that delegations are increasing. The
opinion was recently expressed that the ratio of federal regulations to federal statutes is
of the order 18:1. The Administrative Rule Making Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 1766
Before the House Subcomm. on Rules of the House of the House Committee on Rules,
96th Cong. 1st Sess. 4 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Baumen).
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case we have no way of knowing whether the legislators entertained any
of the thoughts expressed by the judges.
The early federal cases appeared to be faithful to the principle of
non-delegation. "That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the constitution. 2
The earliest exceptions were simple ones. If all the legislature had
done was to delegate fact-finding authority, then power to legislate had
not been delegated. The earliest reported case involved a challenge to
a statute authorizing the President, upon a determination that a foreign
nation had violated the neutral commerce of the United States, to issue
a proclamation prohibiting imports from that nation. 23 Upheld later was
the power granted to the President to ascertain whether certain tariffs
were unequal and unreasonable, and to act accordingly. 24
Somewhat later, the United States Supreme Court appeared to rec-
ognize a broader basis for grants of authority to administrative agencies.
A federal statute authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules
and regulations to carry out the objectives expressed in the statute. This
was more than the mere finding of facts. The Court held that the
regulations issued by the Secretary were the exercise of a power merely
to "fill up the details" in the statute. Thus the Secretary exercised no
legislative power, only administrative or rule-making power. 21
In the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide
general regulations for these various and varying details of man-
agement. Each reservation had its peculiar and special features;
and in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these
local conditions, Congress was merely conferring administrative
functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative
power 26
Significant as this announcement was, this period did not last
long. The Supreme Court soon began to speak in terms of invalidating
delegations made without adequate standards to guide the behavior of
the administrative agency. 21 This approach was a frank recognition that
legislative powers, in addition to administrative duties, could be delegated
to agencies if sufficient standards were provided to govern the conduct
22. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692, 12 S. Ct. 495, 504 (1892).
23. The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
24. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495 (1892).
25. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480 (1911). See B. Schwartz,
Administrative Law § 32, at 69-70 (1976).
26. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 516, 31 S. Ct. at 482-83.
27. See J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928).
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of the administrators. 21 It had proven difficult to draw the fine line
between "filling up" details and actual legislation. To provide for this
conceptual problem, and to acknowledge that the growing complexity
of society required some exercise of authority by agencies, the Supreme
Court agreed that a delegation of power with appropriate standards to
guide the administrator was not a "forbidden" delegation of legislative
power.
29
More recently, even a search for appropriate "standards" is not
often required by the Supreme Court. Though the present practice of
the Supreme Court is somewhat unsettled, it appears that an inquiry
into the reasonableness of the delegation is required, considering the
subject matter of the regulated area, the type of agency to which the
delegation is made, and the necessity for the regulation.30
In summary, it may be said that approval of delegated legislative
power has expanded as the years have passed, virtually without ex-
ception." The criteria for approval appear to be very similar in the
United States Supreme Court and the state courts.
State courts, on the whole, have scrutinized delegations of legislative
authority more carefully than the Supreme Court has. There is a fairly
regular pattern in the types of delegation which have been upheld, and
which have been disapproved. An examination of these types of cases
and the reasons given by the state courts will be useful in establishing
a workable list of criteria for deciding whether delegation of legislative
authority is proper.
28. See the excellent summary and discussion in Note, Safeguards, Standards, and
Necessity: Permissible Parameters for Legislative Delegations in Iowa, 58 Iowa L. Rev.
974 (1973).
29. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409, 48 S. Ct. at 352. See B. Schwartz, supra note 25,
§ 12, at 35.
30. Note, supra note 28, at 987. Most states have seen similar progressions. Louisiana,
for example, went through a period recognizing only fact-finding powers. State ex rel.
Porterie v. Grace, 184 La. 443, 166 So. 133 (1936). It permitted an administrator to "fill
up" details in a statute according to standards set by the legislature. State Bd. of Embalmers
v. Britton, 244 La. 756, 154 So. 2d 389 (1963). More recently, the courts have upheld
delegation of authority to an administrative agency so long as the delegation is "reasonable
and appropriate" in carrying out legislative policy. Faul v. Superintendent of Educ., 367
So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
31. The only notable exceptions were Panama Ref.'-Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55
S. Ct. 241 (1935), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.
Ct. 837 (1935), which involved extremely broad delegations. These cases are usually
explained as the reaction of a conservative Supreme Court to some of the more radical
features of the New Deal. Yet some disfavor of broad delegation, especially of the taxing
authority of the Congress, has recently been demonstrated by National Cable Television
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 94 S. Ct. 1146 (1974). See B. Schwartz, supra
note 25, § 19, at 47; Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 318-29 (1976).
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Criteria Favoring Delegation32
Established Legal Concepts Limiting An Agency's Discretion
Within a Grant of Authority
A delegation of authority to an agency is more likely to be upheld if,
within the grant of authority, there are certain recognized and established
legal concepts which inherently limit the agency's discretion.33 For ex-
ample, in 1972 the Louisiana legislature enacted the Unfair Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Law.34 The Act declares unlawful "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in
commerce. No attempt was made to define these terms, but a "director"
(an executive assistant to the governor) was empowered to make "rules
and regulations interpreting the provisions" of the Act and related
statutes.3" Significantly, the Act does not apply to "any conduct which
complies with" the unfair trade practices section of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.3 6 This is a clear indication that the director should
make reference to federal statutes, regulations, and case law defining
and punishing "unfair trade practices"-a well-developed3 7 concept. The
legislature undoubtedly felt safe in permitting legislative power to be
exercised by the executive in an instance, such as this one, in which
established legal concepts were already available. There are numerous
other examples. 3s
Expert Subject Matter, and Qualification of Agency to Exercise It
If the subject matter of the delegation is one most efficiently and
knowledgeably dealt with by experts, and if the agency to which the
delegation is made is qualified to make such expert judgments, the
32. The author gratefully acknowledges his reliance on the comprehensive discussion
of various criteria in I F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 74-91 (1965). In some
instances, these criteria have been combined and modified for discussion in this article.
References have been made to specific Louisiana applications of these criteria, sometimes
with additional 'criteria beyond those of Cooper.
33. 1 F. Cooper, supra note 32, at 74-75.
34. La. R.S. 51:1401-1418 (Supp. 1984).
35. La. R.S. 51:1405(B) (Supp. 1984).
36. La. R.S. 51:1406 (Supp.; 1984).
37. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
38. The federal statutes granting broad regulatory authority to the Securities and
Exchange Commission contain phrases which have taken on special meaning, and may
now be considered "established" legal concepts: "fair dealing," "just and equitable
principles of trade," and "maintenance of a fair and orderly market." 15 U.S.C. §§
78k, 78f (1982). See also Reyburn v. State Bd. of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 78 N.W.2d
351 (1956) (holding that power to revoke optometry license for "unprofessional conduct"
properly delegated as professional experience and judicial decisions had established the
meaning of that concept); State ex rel. Dalton v. Land Clearance Auth., 364 Mo. 974,
270 S.W.2d 44 (1954) ("fair value" of land).
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delegation is often upheld. A prominent example is state regulation of
public utilities and common carriers (e.g., telephone, electricity, truck-
ing). In many states, including Louisiana, this delegation of "legislative"
authority is actually made by the citizens in the state constitution3 9 This
delegation usually authorizes the commission to adopt and enforce rea-
sonable rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for the discharge
of its duties. In other instances, the legislature may delegate its authority
to legislate on a particular subject matter requiring some expertise, such
as transportation 40 and disposal 4l of hazardous substances, such as ra-
dioactive waste. This would be the area where the Broom delegation
arguably would fall. Again, there are a number of examples. 42
Tradition of Regulation by Administrative Agency
There are also subject matters traditionally governed through delegation
of legislative power; a long history of regulation outside the legislature
supports a broad reading of a delegation of power. Insurance and
banking are two examples. Indeed, it is interesting to observe that until
recently the Louisiana statutes on insurance contained no general ref-
erence to the rulemaking authority of the commissioner of insurance.43
The lawmakers may well have felt that a general reference was unnec-
essary in light of the long tradition of regulation of the insurance
industry. Neither did the banking statutes have any such general reference
until fairly recently, when it was provided that the "commissioner of
financial institutions shall have the power to enact .. .such regulations
as he deems necessary in the best interest of banks . ..consistent with
39. See La. Const. art. IV, § 21.
40. La. R.S. 32:1504 (Supp. 1984).
41. La. R.S. 30:1136 (Supp. 1984).
42. See F. Cooper, supra note 32.
Courts show a readiness to sustain delegations of virtually unlimited discretionary
power if the sphere of regulation is characterized by baffling technicalities so
complex that the judges entertain doubts as to the adequacy of judicial knowledge
and techniques to deal with the matter effectively, or if they sense a need for
experimentation in a new and untrodden field.
Id. at 83. Thus broad delegations have been upheld in Burnham v. Board of Apps., 333
Mass. 114, 128 N.E.2d 772 (1955) (zoning commission); Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d
286, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959) (state treasurer); O'Meara v. Union Oil Co., 212 La. 745, 33
So. 2d 506 (1948) (conservation practices). Cf. State v. Billot, 154 La. 402, 97 So. 589
(1923) (invalidating a delegation to the commissioner of conservation to establish deer
seasons). Billot may also be explained by the fact that a definition of crime was left to
the commissioner's regulations.
43. There appears to have been no specific reference to the power of the commissioner
of insurance to issue necessary regulations until Act 83 of 1977, which reorganized all
departments of the state government and expressly provided such power. See La. R.S.
36:1-960 (Sp. Pamph. 1984) (as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 83); see also La. R.S.
36:682(B)(3) (Supp. 1984) (providing that regulations must be made "in accordance with
the Administrative Procedure Act").
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[federal regulations, services offered by national banks, and powers
granted to state banks by pertinent statutes].""
Power to govern certain professions is traditionally delegated to an
administrative agency-frequently composed of the governed. One need
only note the medical4 and legal46 professions as examples. And some-
times, the "tradition" of regulation by an administrative agency is one
of relatively recent origin. In Louisiana, for example, there are admin-
istrative boards which govern and regulate cosmetologists, 47 watch-
makers,4 and electrologists. 4 9
Adequate Safeguards and Review
In this exercise of quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative authority, admin-
istrative agencies engage both in making rules and in deciding whether
the rules have been violated. This combination of law-giver and law-
interpreter would be strenuously condemned in other contexts (courts,
for example, are very reluctant to accept a legislature's "interpretation"
of a statute). 50
There is a greater likelihood that matters will be left to regulation, and
that this choice will be upheld, if there exist adequate safeguards both
in the formulation of rules and in ascertainment of compliance with
them. In fact, so many delegations of power have occurred during the
last decades that most jurisdictions have adopted the model Adminis-
trative Procedure Act.5" This Act provides for notice of proposed reg-
ulations, hearings on the proposals, notice of hearings of possible
violations, hearings on violations, and complete judicial review of any
final order of an administrative body. Though by its terms the Act
would apply to almost any administrative agency, it is not uncommon
for the legislature to specify in a delegation of power to an agency that
any regulations or decisions of the agency are subject to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.52
44. La. R.S. 6:237(B) (Supp. 1984). The statute also requires that all such regulations
shall be "subject to all provisions of R.S. 49:951 through R.S. 49:953, and R.S. 49:954.1"
of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
45. See La. R.S. 37:1261-1360.27 (Supp. 1984), especially La. R.S. 37:1263, creating
the State Board of Medical Examiners, consisting of seven members appointed by the
governor from lists of names submitted by the State Medical Society and the Louisiana
Medical Association. All the members must be "graduate physicians or surgeons and
practitioners." La. R.S. 37:1263(c) (Supp. 1984).
46. See La. R.S. 37:211-218 (1974 & Supp. 1984) (providing for general supervisory
control of the profession of law by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and for day-to-day
control by a Board of Governors composed entirely of members of the bar).
47. See La. R.S. 37:491-556 (1974 & Supp. 1984).
48. See La. R.S. 37:1581-1612 (1974 & Supp. 1984).
49. See La. R.S. 37:3051-3077 (Supp. 1984).
50. See Ethyl Corp., 351 So. 2d at 1290 and cases cited supra notes 3 & 4.
51. See La. R.S. 49:950-970 (Supp. 1984).
52. See supra notes 43-44.
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Today, when decisions of administrative agencies directly affect the
lives of many citizens, the criteria for adequate procedural and substantive
safeguards for the rights of those citizens are very important. One may
speculate that without a general provision such as the Administrative
Procedure Act, there might have been less delegation of legislative power
than has occurred in recent times.
Public Health, Safety, and Morals Involved
Matters of public health, safety, and morals have traditionally been
considered within the constitutional province of government, so it is not
surprising to find that legislatures have been given broad discretion in
dealing with these problems. Such matters may require more detailed
supervision than a legislature can give, and may sometimes require
immediate action. Thus it is not uncommon to find the great bulk of
legislative authority in these areas delegated to administrative agencies.
One need only think of regulatory authority over cultivation, transpor-
tation and sale of food," transportation of hazardous substances,"4 and
disposition of nuclear waste" as important examples. Again, the Broom
decision involved regulations which might find a place under this heading.
Criteria Not Favoring Delegation
Special Legislative Precision for Protection of Individual
Human Rights
There are some subject matters where American history and constitu-
tional law have required that the legislature retain almost exclusive power.
The definitions of crimes and their sanctions are prime examples. There
are numerous cases invalidating legislation giving an administrative agency
the power to define a crime,16 even by reference to regulations of a
53. La. R.S. 36:621-629 (Supp. 1984). See Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v.
McCrory, 237 La. 768, 112 So. 2d 606 (1959) (Milk Marketing Act); Francis v. State
Livestock Sanitary Bd., 184 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) (disease control in swine).
54. La. R.S. 32:1504 (Supp. 1984).
55. La. R.S. 30:1136 (Supp. 1984). See also the following instances in which a broad
delegation has been upheld where the state police power in matters of public health,
safety, or welfare was squarely at issue: Johnson v. Pearce, 313 So. 2d 812 (La. 1975)
(upholding regulations concerning eradication of brucellosis disease among animals); City
of Lake Charles v. Wallace, 247 La. 285, 170 So. 2d 654 (1965) (upholding charges
imposed on garbage disposal); Baton Rouge Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 156 La. 539, 100 So. 710 (1924) (regulation of water supply); State v. Syas,
136 La. 628, 67 So. 522 (1915) (sewage disposal; delegation upheld even though regulation
defined crime); State v. Snyder, 131 La. 145, 59 So. 44 (1912) (use of saccharin; delegation
upheld even though regulation defined crime).
56. See Comment, Unauthorized Delegation of Legislative Authority to Administrative
Agencies Under the North Carolina Constitution, 11 Wake Forest L. Rev. 269, 284-87
(1975). These cases are often based on a specific provision in a state's criminal code
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federal agency such as the Drug Enforcement Administration." There
is certainly a feeling that when a citizen's life or liberty is at stake, it
is desirable that any sanctions be clearly expressed, and that they lie
within the hands of representatives directly accountable to the 6ublic.11
This was a major factor in the court's reaction in Broom.
Substantial Property Rights or Opportunity to Earn a Living
Close judicial scrutiny is given to delegations of legislative authority
when substantial property rights of citizens are directly affected,5 9 or
when the opportunity to earn one's living may be at stake. Vague or
non-existent standards here are much less likely to be upheld than those
in such subjects as public health and safety. For example, expropriation
procedures (eminent domain) are usually carefully detailed in the con-
stitution and statutes, with nothing left to regulations of administrative
agencies. 60 Some statutes for licensing of occupations may be invalidated
as making too broad a delegation of authority, 61 and may be upheld
only when amended to become more specific and limiting. 62
Presence of Special-Interest Groups
Legislative power should represent an entire society, and should not be
delegated to any single interest group without the opportunity for par-
ticipation or review by other groups. Thus both the legislating body
declaring that the only conduct which is criminal is that defined as criminal in acts of
the legislature or in the state constitution. See, e.g., La. R.S. 14:7 (1974).
57. State v. Rodriguez, 379 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1980).
58. This is the one area where any delegation of legislative power is scrutinized most
carefully. Delegation of authority to the executive branch to define crimes was invalidated
in State v. Maitrejean, 193 La. 824, 192 So. 361 (1939) and State v. Billot, 154 La. 402,
97 So. 589 (1923). Cf. State v. Vaccaro, 200 La. 475, 8 So. 2d 299 (1942) (legislature
could not provide for "triple offender" punishment by reference to a statute of another
state). Similar delegation to the judiciary has also been invalidated, State v. Arkansas
Louisiana Gas Co., 227 La. 179, 78 So. 2d 825 (1955); State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29
So. 2d 758 (1947); State v. Whitlock, 193 La. 1044, 192 So. 697 (1939); State v. Gaster,
45 La. Ann. 636, 12 So. 739 (1893). But see State v. Burch, 365 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1978)
(terms "contemporary community standards," "prurient interest," and "patently offen-
sive" not so indefinite as to constitute delegation of legislative authority to criminal jury).
59. See F. Cooper, supra note 32, at 79-80 (noting the invalidation of delegation of
power to agencies to set "prevailing wage schedules" affecting large numbers of individuals,
or to fix minimum prices for dry cleaning). See, e.g., Dr. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956) (unconstitutional
delegation of power to fix prices under fair trade law).
60. See La. Const. art. I, § 4 (guaranteeing a trial by jury in expropriation pro-
ceedings). See also La. R.S. 48:441-460 (1984) (detailed provisions for so-called "quick-
taking" expropriation proceedings).
61. See, e.g., State v. Morrow, 231 La. 572, 92'So. 2d 70 (1956).
62. Louisiana Bd. of Examiners in Watchmaking v. Morrow, 188 So. 2d 160 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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and the judiciary often mistrust a delegation to a special-interest group,
which might tend to perpetuate its own self-interest rather than seek
the common good. 63
Sometimes these factors may peacefully co-exist. In the banking in-
dustry, for example, both a long history of delegation and specific reference
to the Administrative Procedure Act justify a broad delegation of leg-
islative power. The problem of hazardous waste is closely related to
public health and safety, and also requires considerable expertise to be
properly resolved. When several factors coincide, it it likely that a broad
delegation of legislative power will be upheld.
Legislative Review
Finally, legislative review of administrative regulations and decisions
might favor a broad delegation of power. If the legislating body knows
that the power it delegates cannot be exercised without being exposed
to legislative disapproval, there is less reason to fear the initial delegation.
The legislating body may state a general policy, assign the development
of specific details to administrative consultants, and then review the
product to assure that it comports with the original policy, and does
not create more problems than it solves.
Legislatures at the federal and state levels have developed several tech-
niques of legislative review. Many are similar to the "laying" system
practiced in the British Parliament," in which proposed administrative
regulations are laid before a committee of the Parliament, which ex-
amines them for harmony with the established criteria. 61 Without regard
63. See State Licensing Bd. of Contractors v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 110 So. 2d
847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959), aff'd, 240 La. 331, 123 So. 2d 76 (1960); Dr. Tichenor
Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343
(1956); City of Alexandria v. Alexandria Fire Fighters Ass'n, 220 La. 754, 57 So. 2d 673
(1952). Cf. Faul v. Superintendent of Educ., 367 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979)
(upholding a delegation to local school boards to set up a "second language" program
upon the petition of 2507o of the heads of households of students attending a school,
against the claim that it permitted a minority to control the majority).
64. Boisvert, A Legislative Tool for Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The Lay
System, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 638 (1957); Comment, Legislative Control Over Administrative
Action: The Laying System, 10 J. Mar. J. Prac. & Proc. 515 (1977).
65. The criteria requiring Parliamentary examination of .a regulation are:
(i). that it imposes a charge on the public revenues or contains provisions
requiring payments to be made to the Exchequer or any Government Department
or to any local or public authority in consideration of any license or consent,
or of any service to be rendered, or prescribes the amount of any such charge
or payments;
(ii). that it is made in pursuance of an enactment containing specific pro-
visions excluding it from challenge in the courts, either at all times or after the
expiration of a specific period;
(iii). that it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers
conferred by the Statute under which it is made;
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to the wisdom of the particular regulation, the committee decides whether
the regulation so substantially deviates from the expressed legislative
policy as to merit full review by the entire Parliament. 66 The committee
thus operates as a "screening" group, protecting Parliament from the
expenditure of time which would be required to review all regulations
in a committee of the whole. The committee also serves as an important
deterrent to administrators who might otherwise feel free to take liberties
with the legislature's delegation.
For a while, the so-called "legislative veto" was popular, though it
recently suffered a serious setback in the Supreme Court. 67 A legislative
veto might take several forms, assuming it could pass constitutional
muster. A legislature might authorize an agency to draft regulations to
be submitted to the legislature for approval. Another veto procedure
might be to require that both houses vote to disapprove the regulations;
if both houses did not so vote, the regulations would be approved. A
modification of this procedure would permit disapproval by a vote of
one house only. Another possibility is to require that both houses vote
to approve the regulations; legislative inaction would amount to dis-
approval. Or the legislature could vest some form of veto power in a
committee or group of committees. Language in State v. Broom casts
serious doubt on the validity of such a system.6"
(iv). that it purports to have retrospective effect where the parent statute
confers no express authority so to provide;
(v). that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in the publication
or in the laying of it before Parliament;
(vi). that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in sending a noti-
fication to Mr. Speaker under the proviso to subsection (1) of section 4 of the
Statutory Instrument Act, 1946, where an Instrument has come into operation
before it has been laid before Parliament;
(vii). that for any special reason its form Qr purport calls for elucidation.
Boisvert, supra note 48, at 644 (citing Select Comm. on Statutory Instruments, Reports,
House of Commons Paper No. 178, at 2 (1950)).
66. Comment, supra note 64, at 523.
67. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764.(1983).
68. The legislature has not only delegated to the director of public safety the
authority to create felonies, it has relinquished most of the supervision over
that authority to its subcommittees and the governor. Even if the delegation
were constitutional, the lack of legislative direction would make the enactment
procedures suspect. Lawmaking is not an executive function.
439 So. 2d at 369. Cf. La. R.S. 30:1136(A)(1) (Supp. 1984).
One may speculate about what might happen to review by other than legislative means
in Louisiana. See La. R.S. 51:1405 (Supp. 1984), which requires that regulations issued
by the director of the office of consumer affairs be submitted to the "permanent advisory
board on consumer protection and the attorney general." The statute provides that "[ulpon
approval by the attorney general," the regulation shall be adopted in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
See also S. 854, 855, 8th Sess., I La. Senate J. 213 (1982), authored by Mr. Nunez,
which would have made some interesting changes in the review of agency rules.
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A system in which a proposed regulation takes effect if the legislature
or its appointed committees fail to disapprove is no doubt the most
practical, though it can be argued that in modern legislative practice
such a review is more theoretical than real. On the other hand, if no
regulation takes effect before legislative approval, more thorough review
is ensured, but most of the advantages of the delegation of legislative
authority have been lost. If the legislature becomes involved in the
details of the regulation, then perhaps it should have drafted them in
the first place.6 9
CONCLUSION
Delegation of legislative authority has not followed any sophisticated,
pre-conceived formula with established criteria. Rather, the various
branches of government have created a modus vivendi based on the
practical necessities of modern society. Nevertheless, essential legislative
powers have been reserved and protected from administrative encroach-
ment. Though the task is difficult, some conclusions about the issue of
delegation may be drawn.
If the power in question is one that directly affects ,the liberties of
individual citizens, it is likely that there will be, and should be, little
or no delegation of authority to regulatory agencies. If the power is an
important legislative one, but one traditionally left to regulations, greater
delegation may be made with the protection of standards adequate to
guide the administrator, and safeguards sufficient to protect the rights
of individual citizens. If the power is one over matters requiring con-
siderable expertise, a broader delegation may be justified. In any event,
a legislating body should carefully consider the possibility of some form
of legislative review, even after the delegation has been made.
Though there is no extended discussion in the opinion, it is apparent
that the doom of the Broom delegation lay in a combination of factors:
(a) a specific constitutional prohibition which, by analogy,70 suggested
69. Some legislative bodies had adopted a harsher and more pervasive review pro-
cedure: "sunset" legislation. See, e.g., La. R.S. 49:190-199 (Supp. 1984). Administrative
agencies must justify their entire existence periodically. If they do not appear, or having
appeared cannot convince the legislature of the importance of their continued existence,
they then go out of existence. The legislative review mechanism contained in "sunset"
legislation has a fixed date for "sunset"; if not affirmatively re-created by the legislature
within the prescribed time period, the statutory foundation simply disappears. More
importantly, in most states no further appropriations may be made to the agency in
question. "Sunset" legislation has proved to be only of limited success. In part, this is
due to limitations on legislative staff making it very difficult to conduct a thorough
review.
70. In his dissent, Justice Blanche observed that article 6, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana
Constitution prohibits a "local governmental subdivision" from defining a felony, and
that the Department of Public Safety does not fit within the definition of a "local
governmental subdivision" in article 6, § 44(1). 439 So. 2d at 376 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
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that only the legislature could define a felony; (b) the criminal context
in which the issue arose, putting at risk the liberty of an individual
citizen; and (c) the lack of any adequate legislative review, leaving the
matter in the hands of a committee or sub-committee and a member
of the executive branch. Future cases may not be quite so clear; perhaps
this discussion will provide food for thought about how best to proceed
in future cases.
